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CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION: THE
SEC’S NEW ROLE AS DIPLOMATIC AND
HUMANITARIAN WATCHDOG
Karen E. Woody*
Buried in the voluminous Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act is an oft-overlooked provision requiring corporate
disclosure of the use of “conflict minerals” in products manufactured by
issuing corporations. This Article scrutinizes the legislative history and
lobbying efforts behind the conflict minerals provision to establish that,
unlike the majority of the bill, its goals are moral and political, rather than
financial. Analyzing the history of disclosure requirements, the Article
suggests that the presence of conflict minerals in an issuer’s product is not
inherently material information and that the Dodd-Frank provision
statutorily renders nonmaterial information material. The provision,
therefore, forces the SEC to expand beyond its congressional mandate of
protecting investors and ensuring capital formation by requiring issuers to
engage in additional nonfinancial disclosures in order to meet the
provision’s humanitarian and diplomatic aims. Further, the Article posits
that the conflict minerals provision is a wholly ineffective means to
accomplish its stated humanitarian goals and likely will cause more harm
than good in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In conclusion, this
Article proposes that a more efficient regulatory model for conflict minerals
is the Clean Diamond Trade Act and the Kimberly Process Certification
Scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
Buried in the voluminous Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act1 (Dodd-Frank) is an oft-overlooked provision requiring
corporate disclosure of the use of “conflict minerals” in products
manufactured by issuing corporations.2 This provision, section 1502 of the
Act, requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce
and regulate corporate disclosures on the use of certain minerals originating
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or one of its
neighboring countries.3 Although the thrust of Dodd-Frank concerns
banking regulations and other measures focusing on the regulation of
financial institutions,4 the legislative history of section 1502 reveals that
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
section of the U.S. Code).
2. § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (Supp. V 2011)).
“Conflict mineral” is defined in the Act as “(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan) [also known as
tantalum], cassiterite [also known as tin ore], gold, wolframite [also known as tungsten], or
their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secretary of
State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining country.” § 1502(e)(4)(A)–(B).
3. See § 1502. Because of the porous borders of the war-torn DRC and the ease with
which smugglers and traders can transport the conflict minerals to the surrounding nations,
the Act includes restrictions on exports from DRC’s neighboring countries. Id. Neighboring
countries include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
4. Dodd-Frank was signed into law on July 21, 2010, by President Obama. See Status
of H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
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Congress included it in the Act due to congressional concern about the
continuing humanitarian crisis in the DRC.5 As will be discussed in depth
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173 (last visited Nov. 16,
2012). The aim of the legislation was the enactment of financial regulatory reform in
response to the recent financial crisis. The Act consists of sixteen titles and drastically
changed the existing financial regulatory structure. Title I is the Financial Stability Act of
2010 and creates the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), tasked with monitoring
systemic risk in the U.S. financial system. See § 111. The FSOC identifies gaps in
regulations that pose a threat to financial stability and efficiency. See § 112. Title I also
creates the Office of Financial Research, tasked with data collection from bank holding
companies and nonbank holding companies. See § 152. Title II relates to the liquidation
authority ascribed to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation. See §§ 201–217. Title III, the Enhancing Financial Institution
Safety and Soundness Act of 2010, abolishes the Office of Thrift Supervision in an attempt
to streamline regulation authorities between different regulators. See §§ 312–313. Title IV is
the Private Fund Investment Advisors Registration Act of 2010 and is intended to increase
regulation of hedge funds. See §§ 401–416. Title V consists of the Federal Insurance Office
Act of 2010 and the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010. See §§ 501–527.
Title VI is the “Bank and Savings Association Holding Company and Depository Institution
Regulatory Improvements Act of 2010” and includes the Volcker Rule, which limits the
ability of banking entities to hold more than three percent of total ownership interest in
hedge funds or private equity funds. See §§ 601, 619. Title VII is the Wall Street
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 and regulates over-the-counter swaps markets,
including credit default swaps and derivatives. See §§ 701–774. Title VIII is the Payment,
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010, which increases regulation of clearing
and settlement activities done by financial institutions. See §§ 801–814. Title IX is the
Investor Protections and Securities Reform Act of 2010, which restructures the regulatory
powers of the SEC and implements additional regulations on broker-dealers, credit rating
agencies, and those offering asset-backed securities and municipal securities. See §§ 901–
991. Title X is the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 and establishes the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection. See §§ 1001–1100H. Title XI deals with the additional
governance and oversight the Act provides to the Federal Reserve System. See §§ 1101–
1109. Title XII, or the Improving Access to Mainstream Financial Institutions Act of 2010,
allows certain organizations to provide incentives to low- and middle-income participants in
the financial system. See §§ 1201–1210. Title XIII is the Pay It Back Act, which amends the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) by limiting the amount of funds available and
prohibiting unused funds from being used for any new programs. See §§ 1301–1306. Title
XIV is the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, which establishes standards
for mortgage loan organizations and appraisers. See §§ 1401–1498. Title XV, where the
conflict minerals provision is located, is simply deemed “Miscellaneous Provisions” and
includes other nonfinancial provisions such as requirements to report on mine safety,
requirements to report on payments by oil, gas, and mineral extractors, and additional
evaluations required of the International Monetary Fund for loans to various countries. See
§§ 1501–1506. Finally, Title XVI deals with section 1256 Contracts of the Internal Revenue
Code that deals with tax implications for futures contracts, foreign currency contracts, or
nonequity options. See § 1601.
5. See § 1502(a) (“It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict
minerals originating in the [DRC] is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme
levels of violence . . . and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein
. . . .”). Congress initiated section 1502 as a result of the actions of a few Senators,
particularly Senator Brownback. See Edward Wyatt, Congo Minerals Provision Becomes
Part of Financial Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at B8. Beyond the personal convictions
of Senator Brownback and other Congressmen, the effort to pass legislation that attempts to
quell the violence in the DRC has been actively supported by nonprofit groups such as the
Enough Project, Global Witness, Resolve, and Friends of the Congo. See Letter from Fr.
Rocco Puopolo, Exec. Dir., Africa Faith & Justice Network, et al., to Russ Feingold, U.S.
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below, section 1502 is not a “financial” regulation, but rather a provision
aimed at ending the atrocities of a war occurring seven thousand miles from
Wall Street. In fact, the prologue of section 1502 expressly declares:
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict
minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping
to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and
gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian
situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13(p) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).6

The eastern region of the DRC has been embroiled in one of the deadliest
conflicts since World War II.7 Fueled by decades of ethnic tensions, the
conflict in the region reached a tipping point when groups of militiamen
fled across the border into the DRC following the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda.8 Although not the underlying cause of the war, mineral resources
in the region supply the funding necessary for local rebel militias to
continue the fight.9 Four minerals in particular have played an integral part
Senator (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://opensocietypolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
Senator-Russ-Feingold-thank-you1.pdf.
6. § 1502(a).
7. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, Death by Gadget, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at
WK11. The conflict in the DRC has claimed the lives of over 5.4 million people. Id.
8. Mary Beth Sheridan, Trying To Curb Trade of “Conflict Minerals,” WASH. POST,
July 21, 2010, at A1. The history of ethnic tensions in the region does not begin with the
Rwandan genocide in 1994. Rather, ethnic battles have plagued Congo for over a century.
See Forever in Chains: The Tragic History of Congo, INDEPENDENT (July 28, 2006), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/forever-in-chains-the-tragic-history-of-congo409586.html#. Originally colonized in 1885 by Belgian King Leopold II, the DRC achieved
independence from Belgium in 1960 but was ruled for the following thirty years by the
authoritarian regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Id. In 1997, Laurent Kabila toppled Mobutu’s
regime, but the country was thrown into civil war, during which rebel groups took over
various regions of the DRC. Id. Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and power shifted to his
son, Joseph Kabila, under whose reign the fighting has not ceased. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-763, CONFLICT MINERALS DISCLOSURE RULE: SEC’S
ACTIONS AND STAKEHOLDER-DEVELOPED INITIATIVES 5 (2012), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592458.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (“As we reported in
2010, illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units are consistently and
directly involved in human rights abuses against the civilian population in eastern DRC and
are involved in the exploitation of conflict minerals and other trades. We also reported that
there is a culture of impunity in eastern DRC in which those who have committed human
rights abuses do not face justice for the crimes they have committed. After decades of
instability and war, the central government in the capital, Kinshasa, currently has little
administrative capacity and control over remote regions, including eastern DRC. The long
distances between the capital and eastern DRC and the rudimentary infrastructure, which
make transportation and communication difficult, further limit the central government’s
control in eastern DRC.”).
9. Shannon Raj, Note, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the
Legislation That Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 985 (2011). In addition
to funding rebel militias, conflict minerals are often smuggled over the DRC border to
neighboring countries in order to subvert or avoid taxation by the Congolese government.
John Prendergast & Sasha Lezhnev, From Mine to Mobile Phone: The Conflict Minerals
Supply Chain, ENOUGH, 5 (NOV. 10, 2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/
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in the ongoing violence: tin, tantalum, tungsten—also known as the
“3Ts”10—and gold. Because these minerals are intrinsically tied to the
violence in the DRC, they are referred to as “conflict minerals” and are the
subject of section 1502.11
Section 1502 requires issuing companies to disclose whether they use
any of the minerals included in the “conflict mineral” definition12 and to
locate the source of the minerals they use.13 Although this may seem like a
minor task, mandating disclosure of the origin of the minerals used in
products is no small request to make of issuers who are now forced to
scrutinize their supply chains. Furthermore, the scope of issuers affected by
this legislation is enormous, as thousands of companies manufacture and
sell products containing at least one “conflict mineral.” For example, the
3Ts can be found in a number of consumer electronic goods, including cell
phones and computers, as well as a number of other nonelectronic products
such as certain types of packaging or even children’s shoes.14 Likewise,
gold is found in jewelry, of course, but can also be found in electric plating
and wiring as well as in components for jet engines.15 The number of
industries, let alone individual companies, that section 1502 affects is
daunting from a regulation standpoint. Nevertheless, the SEC has been
tasked with that regulation, despite never having had to tackle anything
remotely similar to date.
This Article will first discuss the history of disclosure requirements
mandated by the SEC. Part II will then examine the legislative history of
minetomobile.pdf. In Uganda, for example, over $74 million worth of gold was exported in
2007 but only $600 worth of gold was produced by the country in that same year. Id.
Similarly, Rwanda exported upwards of $30 million worth of tin in 2007 but only officially
produced $8 million of that amount. Id.
10. See Prendergast & Lezhnev, supra note 9, at 1. According to estimates, the mineral
trade generates more than $180 million in profit for armed rebel groups in Congo. Roughly
65 percent of the world’s coltan (which can be separated to produce tantalum) reserves are
located in the DRC. Press Release, Brownback, Durbin Introduce Conflict Mining Bill (May
23, 2008), available at http://votesmart.org/public-statement/359180/brownback-durbinintroduce-conflict-mining-bill#.UGCQeZjK2fQ. But see Kristof, supra note 7 (“Even the
Enough Project, an anti-genocide organization that has been a leading force in the current
campaign, estimates that only one-fifth of the world’s tantalum comes from Congo.”).
11. See Dodd-Frank § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (Supp. V 2011).
12. See § 1502(e)(4) (defining conflict mineral as “columbite-tantalite (coltan),
cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives” or “any other mineral or its derivatives
determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining
country”).
13. See § 1502(b).
14. See Prendergast & Lezhnev, supra note 9, at 1. Cassiterite, or tin, is used by the
electronics, automotive, industrial manufacturing, and construction industries as a crucial
component in solders for joining pipes and circuits; it is also used in automobile parts, steel
plating, and various alloys. MICHAEL LITTENBERG ET AL., SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP,
CONFLICT MINERALS DUE DILIGENCE 4 (2012), available at http://www.srz.com/files/
upload/Littenberg_Damania_Valane_PLC_Nov_2011_Conflict_Minerals.pdf.
Children’s
shoes that light up upon impact also contain cassiterite. Id. at 3. Likewise, columbitetantalite, or coltan, is used in hearing aids, pacemakers, carbide tools, and jet engines. Id. at
4. Wolframite, or tungsten, is used in metal wires, electrodes, and welding instruments. Id.
15. LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.
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section 1502 and the SEC’s final rule implementing the provision. In Part
III, this Article will analyze the shortcomings of the new rule, including the
costs imposed on affected industries, and the scope of statutory liability for
noncompliance with the rule. In Part IV, this Article will show that the
regulation and enforcement of section 1502 falls well outside of the SEC’s
mandate. In doing so, this Article criticizes the efficacy of enacting
disclosure requirements for U.S. companies with the aim of exacting a
diplomatic and international benefit and demonstrates that the SEC is not
the appropriate regulatory agency for accomplishing these diplomatic and
humanitarian objectives. Part IV then posits that the legislation will prove
meaningless because if a company both uses conflict minerals and complies
with section 1502, then there is no real consequence other than mere
“naming and shaming.” This Part also analyzes the use of section 1502 as
an embargo with limited international cooperation that could lead to
regulatory arbitrage. Finally, Part V contemplates a different model for
regulating conflict minerals using the example of the Kimberley Process
and the regulation of conflict diamonds.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The Securities and Exchange Commission was founded in 1934 with the
mandate that it would: (a) protect investors; (b) maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets; and (c) facilitate capital formation.16 Notably absent
from that mandate is any authority or charge to effect international,
diplomatic, or human rights-oriented goals. The focus, rather, is preserving
market integrity. The hallmark of the first two prongs of the mandate,
investor protection and assurance of fair markets, lies in market
transparency and is achieved through disclosure of material information to
investors.17 As the SEC states on its own website: “Only through the
steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people
make sound investment decisions.”18
A. Legislative History of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
In 1933, in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (’33 Act).19 The

16. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate].
17. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988); see also Cynthia A.
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1200 (1999).
18. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 16.
19. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77aa (2006)).
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House Committee Report accompanying the ’33 Act20 quotes President
Roosevelt in outlining the Act’s purpose: “What we seek is a return to a
clearer understanding of the ancient truth that those who manage banks,
corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people’s money
are trustees acting for others.”21 The ’33 Act’s primary means of regulating
and enforcing accountability of banks and other financial institutions was
disclosure. Introducing the ’33 Act on the House floor on May 5, 1933,
Representative Sam Rayburn stated:
[T]oday the owner of shares in a corporation possesses a mere symbol of
ownership, while the power, the responsibility, and the substance which
have characterized ownership in the past have been transferred to a
separate group which holds control. . . . The owners of these symbols are
entitled to know what the symbols represent. . . . These managers are
truly trustees. One of their duties as trustees is to furnish security owners,
in being and in prospect, with reliable information.22

The House unanimously adopted Rayburn’s sponsored bill on a voice vote.
The House bill became the final version of the bill, which passed the Senate
on May 23, 1933, and was signed into law by President Roosevelt on May
27, 1933.23 A few months later, in February 1934, Senator Duncan Fletcher
and Representative Rayburn introduced the Securities Exchange Act of
193424 (’34 Act) “for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of
values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary,

20. The bill was drafted by a team of representatives assembled by Felix Frankfurter that
consisted of James Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas Corcoran, who reported to Sam
Rayburn. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 61–63 (3d ed. 2003).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). Professor Williams points out that Roosevelt was
highly influenced by the writings of Louis Brandeis and his emphasis on the importance of
disclosure in securities regulation. Williams, supra note 17, at 1212–14. Indeed, Brandeis is
oft-quoted for the saying: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.” Id. at 1212. Professor Williams also notes that Brandeis greatly
influenced Felix Frankfurter, who was instrumental in passing the Securities Act of 1933 and
was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court by Roosevelt. Id. at 1221–22.
22. 77 CONG. REC. 2910 (1933) (statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn). In his introduction,
Congressman Rayburn relied on a book by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, which pointed
out the drastically increasing rise in economic power that large corporations enjoyed. Id. at
2918 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)). Berle and Means noted that in large corporations, ownership
and control became increasingly separated and that, without adequate accountability,
“controllers” could profit from actions that were not in shareholders’ interests. See ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
119–25 (1932). Because of this, Berle and Means argued for a shift in management’s
fiduciary duties. See id. at 220–32. In addition, Berle and Means emphasized that disclosure
requirements would promote market efficiency and price discovery, and would act as an
additional means of accountability for corporate managers. See id. at 317–25.
23. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 38.
24. 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006)). The
’34 Act created the SEC and empowered it with broad authority over the securities industry,
including the power to require periodic reporting of information by companies with publicly
traded securities. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.
gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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unwise, and destructive speculation.”25 The Senate Committee Report,
acknowledging that the individual stock exchanges faced challenges when
attempting to increase the amount of information that companies disclosed,
made clear that the prerequisite for trading on an exchange would be the
“furnishing of complete information relative to the financial condition of
the issuer, which information shall be kept up to date by adequate periodic
reports.”26 Similarly, the House Committee Report underscored the
importance of “honest publicity” in the disclosure of complete and accurate
financial statements on a regular basis in order to achieve accurate valuation
of securities.27
In passing the ’33 and ’34 Acts, Congress mandated regular material
First,
disclosures by companies with publicly traded securities.28
companies must make initial disclosures when new securities are issued to
the public.29 Thereafter, public companies must make periodic disclosures
quarterly and annually.30 Disclosures are also required regarding elections
at annual shareholder meetings,31 as well as when any major corporate
event takes place, such as a merger or sale of the business.32
B. The Importance of Materiality
The disclosure regime established in the ’33 and ’34 Acts is intended to
be a regulatory mechanism that allows for investor protection and accurate
valuations of securities.33 Disclosure regulations also boost investor
confidence and incentivize corporate managers to behave more diligently.34
To comply with disclosure regulations, publicly traded companies must

25. 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
26. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 10 (1934).
27. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11–12 (1934).
28. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77aa (2006)); 48 Stat. 881.
29. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 7, 10.
30. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12, 13, 15D.
31. Id. §§ 14(f), 15.
32. Id. § 14.
33. See generally Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123 (2004). Professor Guttentag
analyzes the economic and regulatory benefits of imposing additional disclosure
requirements on public companies when balanced against the costs of disclosure by private
or public firms. See generally id. at 132–65. He points out that disclosure requirements can
improve share price accuracy, reduce the amount of information to which only managers
have access, and reduce agency costs because the more the parties to a transaction are
informed, the less they will need a regulator to evaluate the merits of the transaction. Id. at
133–35.
34. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146
(2006) (“The emphasis in securities law on providing information to the public is premised
on the belief that individuals are rational, self-governing actors who are willing and able to
process the information wisely. If we assume that investors are rational risk calculators who
are consistently capable of weighing the costs and benefits of risky alternatives and selecting
the best option, then a system of disclosure makes good sense.”).
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disclose any information considered material.35 The ’33 and ’34 Acts
prohibit the disclosure of any untrue statement of material fact or any
omission of material fact.36 Neither Congress, the SEC, nor the Supreme
Court defined “material information” until 1976, when the Court resolved
the issue in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.37 Specifically, the Court held
that a material fact is one that “would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”38 This was generally understood to mean “information that
significantly affected a company’s financial performance and consequently
translated into stock market gains or losses.”39
In 1988, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard of materiality in
Basic v. Levinson40 and unanimously held that a bright-line rule regarding
what information is considered material is inappropriate and unnecessary.41
The Court stated that materiality is, as Professor Langevoort described,
“about what is important to investors, nothing more and nothing less.”42
Specifically, the Basic Court held that a fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote in a corporate election.43 The Court
applied the “probability times magnitude test” for estimating when
speculative or forward-looking information is sufficiently important to rise
to the level of “material.”44
Since its TSC and Basic rulings, the Supreme Court, as well as the SEC
through its regulations, has implicitly defined material information as
information that bears on the economic value of an investment.45 The
35. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988).
36. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k–l, 78j. SEC Rules expanded on this general theory. For
example, Regulation S-K sets forth certain information that companies must disclose. 17
C.F.R. § 229 (2012). Likewise, Rule 408 and Rule 12b-20 provide that “there shall be added
such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.” Id.
§§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20. Failure to comply with these rules can expose a company to
Rule 10b-5 antifraud liability. Id. § 240.10b-5.
37. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
38. Id. at 449.
39. John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an
Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 42 (1998). Fedders points out that in the
wake of TSC Industries, the SEC attempted to adopt a qualitative, rather than quantitative,
standard for materiality and traces the SEC’s efforts throughout the 1970s and 1980s to
enforce qualitative disclosure. Id. at 43. Qualitative disclosure included unadjudicated
violations of law, as well as the issuer’s or management’s antisocial or unethical behavior,
regardless of the impact on the issuer’s bottom line. Id. at 43–44. Fedders concludes that the
qualitative standard has since met its demise because “[i]t was a standard that had no
standards.” Id. at 86.
40. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
41. Id. at 249.
42. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152 (2009).
43. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968)).
44. Id.
45. Williams, supra note 17, at 1264.
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SEC’s understanding of the materiality standard is that a reasonable
investor “generally focuses on matters that have affected, or will affect, a
company’s profitability and financial outlook.”46 As will be described in
more depth below, congressional action since the ’33 and ’34 Acts has
sought to enlarge the scope of the materiality definition to include
nonfinancial information, including the issuer’s use of conflict minerals as
mandated in section 1502.
II. DODD-FRANK SECTION 1502
In 2001, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), in response to the unending
violence and human rights abuses occurring in the DRC, passed a resolution
in which it condemned “all illegal exploitation of the natural resources of
the [DRC], demand[ed] that such exploitation cease and stress[ed] that the
natural resources of the [DRC] should not be exploited to finance the
conflict in that country.”47 Subsequently, the UNSC called on member
states to “take measures, as they deem appropriate, to ensure that importers,
processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products under
their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on the origin
of the minerals they purchase.”48
Eight years later, in the summer of 2009, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton visited the DRC to encourage the Congolese government and the
United Nations to end the violence that is ravaging the country.49 Secretary
Clinton’s publicized concerns with the state of affairs in the DRC was not
news to then-Senator Sam Brownback, who had already drafted legislation
requiring action to alleviate the crisis in the DRC.50 Senators Richard
Durbin and Russ Feingold had also traveled to the DRC and were struck by
the deleterious humanitarian situation. Joined by Congressman Jim
McDermott, the Senators introduced new legislation to address the crisis.51
46. Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Memorandum from David B.H.
Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to Laura Unger, Acting Chair, SEC (May 8, 2001)).
47. S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1376 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1376(2001).
48. S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1857(2008).
49. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Clinton Presses Congo on Illicit Minerals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 2009, at A7. Of particular concern for Secretary Clinton was the increased violence
against women, as she declared, “Women are being turned into weapons of war.” Id. More
than 200,000 rapes were reported since the beginning of the current war in DRC, resulting in
eastern Congo being labeled the “rape capital of the world.” See Margot Wallstrom,
“Conflict Minerals” Finance Gang Rape in Africa, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/14/conflict-minerals-finance-gang-rape.
The militant groups have used sexual violence as a war tactic. Id.
50. See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
51. See Press Release, Russ Feingold, U.S. Senator, Feingold Statement on Congo
Conflict Minerals and Transparency Amendments to Financial Regulatory Reform Bill (May
19, 2010), available at http://www.africafocus.org/printit/mob.php?http://www.africafocus.
org/docs10/cgk1007a.php (“This amendment specifically responds to the continued crisis in
the eastern region of the [DRC]. Despite efforts to curb the violence, mass atrocities and
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The result of the initial efforts by Senators Brownback, Feingold, and
Durbin was section 1502, which was added to Dodd-Frank in the Senate
during floor debate on the initial Senate version (i.e., the pre-conferencecommittee version) of the bill.52 Eventually, Amendment No. 3997, also
known as the Brownback Amendment and later section 1502, was
confirmed by unanimous consent pursuant to a voice vote.53
A. Legislative History and the Evolution of Section 1502
The genesis of section 1502 reveals a great deal about the goals of its
drafters. As early as 2008, variations of legislation similar to the
Brownback Amendment had been put forth by members of Congress, often
by Senator Brownback himself. In May 2008, Senator Brownback
introduced a bill in the Senate Finance Committee, which was cosponsored
by Senator Durbin, called the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008
(CCCA).54 This bill, had it become law, would have made it unlawful to
import products from the DRC that contain coltan or cassiterite.55 At the
time of this bill’s introduction, Senator Brownback stated in a press release
that this legislation was intended to “bring accountability and transparency
to the supply chain of minerals used in the manufacturing of many
electronic devices.”56
The CCCA never received a floor vote, and on April 23, 2009, Senator
Brownback again introduced legislation, this time in the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, to address the humanitarian crisis
in the DRC.57 The contours of Senator Brownback’s subsequently
proposed bill, called the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (CCMA),
were much more closely aligned with the Brownback Amendment. The
CCMA took a noted step back from the more aggressive CCCA in that it
did not include criminal penalties for willfully violating the CCMA’s other
provisions.58 Like the Brownback Amendment, the CCMA would have
amended the ’34 Act by adding certain disclosure requirements, and it
widespread sexual violence and rape continue at an alarming rate. Some have justifiably
labeled eastern Congo as ‘the worst place in the world to be female.’ Several of us in this
body, including Senators Brownback and Durbin and I, have traveled to this region and seen
first-hand the tragedy of this relentless crisis.”).
52. See 156 CONG REC. S3865–66 (daily ed. May 18, 2010).
53. See id.
54. S. 3058, 110th Cong. (2008).
55. Id. §§ 3–4.
56. Press Release, Sam Brownback, supra note 10.
57. Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009). Similar
legislation was proposed in the House of Representatives by Rep. Jim McDermott. See
Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009).
58. Compare S. 891, with S. 3058. According to Senator Feingold, “[W]e must tread
carefully because there are many communities in eastern Congo whose livelihoods are
intertwined with the mining economy. All-out prohibitions or blanket sanctions could be
counterproductive and negatively affect the very people we seek to help. I am confident that
[the CCMA] is sensitive to that complex reality.” 155 CONG REC. 10600 (2009) (statement
of Sen. Feingold).
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would have made it U.S. policy to promote peace and security in the
DRC.59
Several important differences exist between the reporting requirements
mandated by the proposed CCMA and section 1502. For example, the
disclosure requirements under section 1502 apply only to those who require
conflict minerals for “the functionality or production of a product
manufactured by such person.”60 The proposed CCMA, on the other hand,
would have applied to persons who engaged in “the commercial
exploration, extraction, importation, exportation, or sale of” conflict
minerals or use conflict minerals “in the manufacture of a product for
sale.”61 Moreover, the CCMA would have applied the disclosure
requirements not only to parties that engage in the relevant activities but
also to any person who controls another person or entity (defined as
controlling 50 percent of the voting stock or capital) that engages in the
relevant activities.62 Conversely, section 1502 applies only to those persons
who actually manufacture or contract to manufacture the products.63 Thus,
section 1502’s disclosure requirements apply to a substantially narrower
group of companies than the CCMA. Nevertheless, this legislation affects
companies throughout the entire supply chain because they need to be
prepared to respond to due diligence requests from those subject to the
disclosure requirements.
Besides the difference in scope, there are several other important
differences between the proposed CCMA and section 1502. One important
difference is that section 1502 requires an independent audit of the source
and chain of custody of the conflict minerals, along with an identification of
the auditor, the facilities used to process the conflict minerals, the country
of origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts used to determine the mine
location.64 The CCMA would have only required the disclosure of the mine

59. See S. 891 §§ 3, 5. Ultimately, this bill was cosponsored by twenty-two senators in
addition to Senator Brownback. See Status of S. 891 (111th): Congo Conflict Minerals Act
of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-891 (last visited Nov. 16,
2012). At the time the CCMA was introduced in committee, Senator Brownback stated,
“We have taken a strong hard look at [the CCCA] and have done our best to improve on it.”
155 CONG. REC. 10598 (2009) (statement of Sen. Brownback). Senator Feingold, joining as
an original co-sponsor, added that “the long-term goal is not to shut this trade down, but to
support a conflict-free mining economy that benefits the Congolese people.” Id. at S4697
(statement of Sen. Feingold).
60. Dodd Frank, § 1502(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2011). The SEC’s final
rule did not shed much light on what will be considered “necessary for the functionality or
production of a product” and instead indicated that it would be a fact based determination on
a case-by-case basis. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,349 (Sept. 12,
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). Notably, the SEC’s final rule omitted a
de minimis exception, so any trace amount of a conflict mineral in a product will require the
issuer to comply with section 1502. Id. at 56,298.
61. S. 891 § 5.
62. See id.
63. See Dodd-Frank § 1502(b).
64. See id.
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of origin of the conflict minerals with no independent audit necessary.65
Additionally, the final version of section 1502 deleted a provision that
would have allowed the SEC to review or temporarily waive the disclosure
requirements if the SEC determined that a waiver was “(A) necessary for
the protection of investors; and (B) in the public interest.”66 Another
important difference is that the CCMA would not have obligated companies
to post the required disclosures on their company website.67 Overall, these
changes were a product of Congress’s additional consideration of the
complex issues surrounding conflict minerals and the influence of a myriad
of industry members affected by the legislation.68
B. What Section 1502 Requires
Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank amends section 13 of ‘the ’34 Act69 by
increasing mandatory disclosure requirements for producers of goods that
include minerals derived from the DRC.70 In general, this provision
mandates the annual disclosure of whether conflict minerals necessary in
the production of a company’s manufactured goods originate in the DRC or
an adjoining country.71 The term “conflict mineral” is defined to mean
“(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan) [also known as tantalum], cassiterite [also
known as tin ore], gold, wolframite [also known as tungsten], or their
derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the
Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining
country.”72 If the conflict minerals in use originated in the DRC or an
adjoining country, the disclosing party must submit a report to the SEC that
includes: (i) a description of the due diligence process undertaken by the
disclosing party with regard to the source and chain of custody of those
conflict minerals, which must be independently audited;73 and (ii) a
description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured
that are not “DRC conflict free,” the identity of the independent auditor of
the source and supply chain, the facilities that process the conflict minerals
used by the disclosing party, the country from which the conflict minerals
were obtained, and the efforts used to determine the origin (i.e., the specific
65. See S. 891 § 5.
66. Compare § 1502(b), with S. 891 § 5.
67. Compare § 1502(b), with S. 891.
68. According to Senator Feingold, “The Brownback amendment was narrowly crafted
in consideration of [industry members’] challenges, and it includes waivers and a sunset
clause after five years” to help properly balance the competing concerns. Press Release, Russ
Feingold, supra note 51.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
70. Dodd-Frank, § 1502(b).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A). “Adjoining countries” include Angola, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zambia.
72. Dodd-Frank § 1502(e)(4)(A)–(B).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i). This independent audit must be certified by the
disclosing party, which is an integral part of the due diligence process. Id. Additionally, this
audit must be considered reliable by the SEC. See id. § 78m(p)(1)(C).
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mine) of the conflict mineral.74 For a product to be considered “DRC
conflict free,” the product must not contain minerals that finance, directly or
indirectly, any armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries.75
The reach of this disclosure requirement extends to any individual or
company subject to any of the ’34 Act’s disclosure requirements if such
companies or individuals require conflict minerals in the production of the
products they manufacture or contract to be manufactured.76 Beyond
making the relevant disclosures to the SEC, those subject to this provision
must post the required disclosures on their company websites.77
Within 270 days of the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC was required to
promulgate regulations concerning the disclosure requirements mandated
under subsection (p) of the ’34 Act.78 The SEC issued proposed regulations
in December 2010,79 and received thousands of comments during the
comment period.80 In April 2011, the SEC announced that its target date
for publication of the final rule would be between August 2011 and
December 2011.81 Because of the numerous and varied concerns expressed
by companies that are required to comply with the new provision, the SEC
held a roundtable discussion in October 2011 to discuss stakeholder issues.
In December 2011, the SEC stated that it would issue its final rule between
January and June 2012.82 Due to the intensity of comments from the
public, Congress, and affected companies, as well as the amount of time
that was required to perform an economic analysis, the SEC again delayed
the final rule, but stated in July 2012 that it would vote on the final rule on
August 22, 2012.83 On that date, the final rule was issued and adopted by
the Commission by a 3–2 vote.84
74. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
75. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(D).
76. Id. § 78m(p)(2)(A)–(B).
77. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(E).
78. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A).
79. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b).
80. See Proposed Rule: Conflict Minerals, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4010/s74010.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Comments on Proposed Rule].
81. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at prologue. The SEC delayed issuing the final
rules due to the complexity of the regulation and the numerous amounts of comments
provided by industry members, congressional representatives, and nongovernmental
organizations. See Comments on Proposed Rule, supra note 80. The comment period was
opened again in the fall of 2011 to allow additional comments on the proposed rules.
Conflict Minerals Final Rule Deadline Postponed Again: SEC Makes It Official,
SUSTAINABILITY COUNSEL (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:44 AM), http://sustainabilitycounsel.com/2012/01/17/conflict-minerals-final-rule-deadline-postponed-again-sec-makesit-official/.
82. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8.
83. Id.
84. Press Release, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict Minerals (Aug. 22,
2012), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-163.htm. Commissioners Schapiro,
Aguilar, and Walter voted in favor of the final rule; Commissioners Paredes and Gallagher
dissented. See Edith Orenstein, SEC Narrowly Passes Conflict Minerals, Resource
Extraction Rules, FIN. REPORTING BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://www.financial
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C. The SEC’s Final Rule: Three Steps for Compliance
The SEC’s regulations set out three steps issuers should follow in order
to comply with the requirements of section 1502.85 These steps are outlined
below.
1. Determining if the Provision Applies
First, issuers must determine whether section 1502 applies to them.86 As
noted above, the provision applies to any issuer that files reports with the
SEC under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the ’34 Act, and for which conflict
minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of a product
manufactured by that issuer.87 According to the SEC’s final rule, issuers
that directly manufacture products using conflict minerals, as well as those
that contract the manufacturing of such products, are subject to the rule.88
Under the proposed rule, this included issuers selling generic products
under their own name brand, as long as the issuer had contracted with
another party to have the product manufactured specifically for that
issuer.89 However, under the final rule, the SEC narrowed the scope of
companies considered to have “contracted to manufacture” certain products.
Specifically, a company is considered to be “contracting to manufacture” a
product if it has some actual influence over the manufacturing of that
product.90 The SEC clarified this definition by listing examples of when a
company is not deemed to have influence over the manufacturing of a
product such as (1) if a company merely affixes its brand, marks, logo or
label to a generic product manufactured by a third party; (2) if a company
services, maintains, or repairs a product manufactured by a third party; or
(3) if a company specifies or negotiates contractual terms with a

executives.org/KenticoCMS/FEI_Blogs/Financial-Reporting-Blog/August-2012/SECNarrowly-Passes-Conflict-Minerals,-Resource-Ex.aspx.
85. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,283 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 56,274. Although the proposed rule stated that the SEC would consider miners
as “manufacturers” subject to the regulation, the SEC exempted miners from the definition
of manufacturers in its final rule. Compare id. at 56,292, with Conflict Minerals Proposed
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,972 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229,
249b).
88. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,288.
89. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,952.
90. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,291. Thus, under the proposed rule,
Costco would have been a good example of a nonmanufacturer that contracted for the
manufacturing of its own products, namely its Kirkland Signature brand. See Conflict
Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,952. Under the final rule, however, Costco does
not fall under the definition of manufacturer unless it has “actual influence over the
manufacturing” of the products to which it affixes its label. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77
Fed. Reg. at 56,291. This change to the final rule came as a result of aggressive lobbying by
major retailers such as Wal-Mart and Target. See Jessica Holzer, Wal-Mart, Target Avoid
Mining Rule, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2012, at B1.
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manufacturer that do not directly relate to the manufacturing of the
product.91
In addition, in assessing whether the provision applies, issuers must
determine if the conflict minerals are “necessary” to the functionality or
production of the product.92 The SEC did not define when a conflict
mineral is necessary to the functionality or production of a product in its
proposed rule; however, the two congressional sponsors of section 1502
indicated in a comment letter that they believe the provision should cover
“all uses of conflict minerals coming from DRC—except those that are
‘naturally occurring’ or ‘unintentionally included’ in the product.”93 The
SEC’s final rule stated that issuers should consider whether the conflict
mineral is necessary to the product’s “generally expected function, use or
purpose,” and if the conflict mineral is included only for purposes of
decoration or embellishment, whether the primary purpose of the product is
ornamentation. 94 Notably absent from the final rules is a de minimis
exception for such products. Therefore, any product with any trace of
conflict minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of the
product must comply with the rule’s disclosure requirements.
2. Determining if the Minerals are “Conflict”
Once issuers have determined that their products contain minerals listed
in section 1502, they must determine if these minerals are conflict minerals,
as defined by the statute, and conduct an inquiry into the origin of the
contents of their products.95 In determining the origin of the minerals, the
regulation requires a “reasonable country of origin inquiry,” undertaken in
good faith.96 However, the SEC did not set forth guidelines as to what
constitutes a reasonable country of origin inquiry.97 Nevertheless, the rule
requires that issuers disclose the origin of the minerals, even if the origin is
not the DRC or a neighboring country.98
The SEC clarified that one way for an issuer to satisfy the reasonable
country of origin inquiry is for the issuer to receive reasonably reliable
representations from the facility that processed its conflict minerals that
those minerals did not originate from the DRC or a neighboring country.99
This concept of a “conflict-free smelter” as satisfying the requirement under
section 1502 has spurred some industry participants to implement a
91. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,291.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2011).
93. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,953.
94. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,297.
95. Id. at 56,291.
96. Id. at 56,310–12.
97. Id. at 56,311 (“The final rule does not specify what steps and outcomes are necessary
to satisfy the reasonable country of origin inquiry requirement because, as stated in the
Proposing Release, such a determination depends on each issuer’s particular facts and
circumstances.”).
98. Id. at 56,314–15.
99. Id. at 56,312.
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conflict-free smelter program aimed at creating a list or network of clean
smelters.100
If, after completing a reasonable country of origin inquiry, the company
knows or has reason to believe that the minerals did not originate in any of
the listed countries or are from scrap or recycled sources, the company must
provide a brief description of the basis for its determination.101 This
disclosure must be provided on newly created Form SD, which the issuer
must file with the SEC.102 The issuer must also post that description on its
website and disclose the website address to the SEC on Form SD.103
On the other hand, if a company knows or has reason to believe that the
minerals may have originated in one of the listed countries or may not be
from scrap or recycled sources, the company must perform due diligence on
the source and supply chain of its minerals and submit a Conflict Minerals
Report (CMR) as an exhibit to Form SD.104 The CMR must also be posted
on the company website.105
3. Creating the Conflict Mineral Report
The CMR itself must include proof that the company conducted due
diligence on the source and supply chain of the conflict minerals.106 The
quality of this due diligence must meet a standard that is nationally or
internationally recognized, such as the due diligence guidance approved by
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).107
A company’s products can still be labeled “DRC conflict free” if the
minerals originate from one of the listed countries but they did not finance
or benefit armed groups.108 If a company determines, after conducting due
diligence, that its products are “DRC conflict free,” it is not required to file
a CMR with its Form SD, but must include in its Form SD a description of
the due diligence undertaken and the results thereof.109
If, after conducting due diligence, a company cannot assert that its
products are “DRC conflict free,” then the company must state in its CMR:
(1) that the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured have
100. See Elec. Indus. Citizenship Coal., Inc. & Global e-Sustainability Initiative, EICCGeSI Conflict Free Smelter Assessment Program: Frequently Asked Questions, CONFLICT
FREE SMELTER, 12 (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.conflictfreesmelter.org/documents/ConflictFreeSmelterFAQ.pdf. Elements of the conflict-free smelter program include: (1) due
diligence where companies work with their suppliers to verify the smelters in their mineral
supply chain; (2) third-party validation of a smelter’s sourcing practices and a determination
of whether its sources are conflict free; and (3) an in-region mineral certification system that
enables the traceability and certification of minerals mined in the DRC. Id. 9–11.
101. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,285.
102. Id. at 56,312.
103. Id. at 56,361–63.
104. Id. at 56,320–24.
105. Id. at 56,333.
106. Id. at 56,320–24.
107. Id. at 56,324.
108. Id. at 56,317.
109. Id. at 56,320–21.
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not been found to be “DRC conflict free”; (2) the facilities used to process
the conflict minerals; (3) the country of origin of the conflict minerals; and
(4) the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the “greatest
possible specificity.”110 In addition, the company must (1) obtain an
independent private sector audit of its CMR; (2) certify that it obtained the
audit; (3) identify the auditor; and (4) append a copy of the audit report as
part of the CMR.111
Finally, if a company is unable to determine whether its products are
“DRC conflict free,” because it cannot determine the country of origin or
whether the minerals in its products financed or benefited armed groups, it
will be subject to a temporary two-year transition period during which its
products will be labeled “DRC conflict undeterminable.”112 For smaller
reporting companies, the temporary transition period is extended to four
years.113 The company must still file a CMR, stating: (1) the facilities used
to process the conflict minerals; (2) the country of origin, if known; (3) the
efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible
specificity; and (4) the steps the company has taken or will take to mitigate
the risk that its necessary conflict minerals benefit armed groups, including
any steps to improve its due diligence process.114 In this case, however, the
company is not required to obtain an independent private sector audit of its
CMR.115
III. LOGISTICAL ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTING SECTION 1502
Section 1502 presents a number of potential challenges. It creates
significant hurdles to issuers, and costs of compliance with the regulation
could be astronomical, depending on the issuer and its product. The
provision itself is also vague, creating additional obstacles to effective and
efficient compliance. In addition, it places an unrealistic burden on the
SEC to regulate a provision aimed at eradicating human rights abuses—an
area in which the SEC does not tread.
A. Cost of Compliance
Section 1502 has a number of critics in all arenas that cite a variety of
obstacles with the implementation of the provision.116 The sharpest
criticisms of section 1502 came from industry members who the
requirement will affect and who believe the requirement is overly
burdensome in terms of cost.117 The SEC was well aware of the economic
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 56,281.
114. Id. at 56,320–21.
115. Id. at 56,321.
116. See Comments on Proposed Rule, supra note 80 (listing comment letters received by
the SEC).
117. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,286, 56,291.
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concerns surrounding the rule, as numerous comments to the SEC from
industry members stressed the financial burdens of compliance.118 The
SEC estimated in its proposed rule that the cost for those affected by the
regulation will total approximately $71 million.119 In its final rule,
however, the SEC estimated that the financial burden would be
approximately $3–4 billion at the outset in order for companies to develop
compliance programs.120 The SEC then estimated that it would cost
approximately $207–609 million for annual ongoing compliance.121
However, the National Association of Manufacturers estimates that the
compliance costs will be between $8 and $16 billion.122
Nonprofit lobbying groups have rebutted the arguments claiming that the
legislation is too burdensome to implement, pointing to a statement made
by Hewlett Packard—in front of several other titans of the electronics
industry—that compliance with section 1502 would cost those companies
less than one cent per product.123 The Hewlett Packard statement, however,
might not be indicative of the costs across the industry, according to a
Tulane Law study undertaken in October 2011.124 The Tulane study found
that the proposed rule’s estimated cost of $71.2 million underestimated the
implementation cost, in part because it did not take into account the range
of actors affected by the law.125 The study further noted, “On the other
hand, the [National Association of Manufacturers’] estimate of $9–16
billion overstates these costs by inflating the supplier number and not taking
into account significant overlap in supplier/customer relationships, as well
as cost efficiencies from existing (and developing) information exchange

118. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Cecilia L. Gardner, Pres., CEO & Gen. Counsel,
Jewelers Vigilance Comm., et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter JVC Comment Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4010/s74010-144.pdf.
119. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,965 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b).
120. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,334.
121. Id. The SEC acknowledged in the open meeting issuing the final rule that
pinpointing an actual estimate for this rule was nearly impossible due to the number of
assumptions those creating the economic analysis had to make. Daniel M. Gallagher,
Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rule to Implement Section 1502
of the Dodd-Frank Act—the “Conflict Minerals” Provision (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter
Statement of Commissioner Gallagher], available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/
spch082212dmg-minerals.htm.
122. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,334.
123. See Intel Hit by Protests over Congo Minerals, THINQ.CO.UK (May 27, 2010),
http://www.thinq.co.uk/2010/5/27/intel-hit-by-protests-over-congo-minerals/
[hereinafter
Intel & Congo Minerals].
124. See Chris Bayer, A Critical Analysis of the SEC and NAM Economic Impact Models
and the Proposal of a 3rd Model in View of the Implementation of Section 1502 of the 2010
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS (Oct.
17, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/tulane-study.pdf.
125. Id. at 3.
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platforms.”126 Based on its own assessments, the Tulane study estimated
the cost of implementing the regulation to be $7.93 billion.127
Citing the Tulane study, additional comment letters were sent to the SEC,
including one from Senator Olympia Snowe and other members of
Congress, pressing the SEC to consider the cost to small businesses forced
to comply with section 1502.128 In her letter, Snowe wrote that members of
the Senate and House Small Business Committees were concerned that the
SEC’s initial analysis of the costs of the proposed rule and its impact on
small businesses was inadequate.129 Among other things, the Senator urged
the SEC to consider adding a de minimis standard to the regulation,
exempting products that contain less than a set amount of conflict minerals
from the regulation.130 In addition, they encouraged the SEC to consider
creating an “indeterminate origin” category within the rule to allow for a
more lenient standard for compliance if small businesses are unable to
determine the origin of the minerals.131 Although the SEC raised its cost
estimates in the final rule, it still did not carve out any exemptions for small
businesses nor did it exempt the de minimis use of conflict minerals.132
Indeed, despite including an economic analysis of the regulation in the
SEC final rule, the business community has already challenged the SEC
over the costs associated with compliance, and recent case law indicates
that the SEC may be fighting a losing battle regarding the adequacy of its
cost assessment.133 In a recent ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC,134 the
D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s proxy disclosure rule, in part because
the agency did not conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis.135 In a fairly
scathing opinion, the court held that the agency “acted arbitrarily and
capriciously for having failed once again . . . [to] adequately . . . assess the
economic effects of a new rule.”136 The court also determined that the SEC
“inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of
126. Id.
127. Id. (“Almost half of the total cost—$3.4 billion—would be met with in-house
company personnel time, and the rest—$4.5 billion—would comprise outflows to 3rd parties
for consulting, IT systems and audits. Comparing the costs to the issuers vs. the suppliers,
the bulk of the total costs—$5.1 billion or 65%—would be incurred by the suppliers (the
group not included in SEC’s analysis), while the smaller portion of the total—$2.8 billion or
35%—would be carried by the issuers.”).
128. Comment Letter from Olympia Snowe, U.S. Senator, et al., to Mary Schapiro,
Chairman, SEC 1 (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s
74010-427.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id.
132. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,298, 56,359 (Sept. 12, 2012)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
133. C.M. Matthews, Business Groups Sue To Block “Conflict Minerals” Rule, WSJ
BLOGS (Oct. 22, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/10/22/
business-groups-sue-to-block-conflict-minerals-rules/.
134. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1148.
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the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why
those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive
judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems
raised by commenters.”137 Given that the Tulane study and other industry
estimates are drastically higher than the SEC estimate for the costs
associated with section 1502 compliance, the agency may very well have
delayed its final regulations to ensure that it can protect against a result
similar to the Business Roundtable decision.138 Nonetheless, the recent
challenge of section 1502 by the National Association of Manufacturers and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce indicates that the affected industries are
unwilling to merely accept the costs associated with this provision.
B. Problems with Determining the Source of Minerals
One of the more serious critiques of this first-of-its-kind legislation is
that it is too difficult for companies to determine whether the minerals used
in production are in fact conflict minerals.139 Shortly after the passage of
Dodd-Frank, the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and
Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI)—both industry trade groups—
commissioned a report by Resolve, an American nonprofit organization,
which outlined three major challenges concerning conflict mineral
transparency requirements down to the mining-level.140 These concerns
were: (1) supply chains are not sufficiently transparent to this level;
(2) tracking capacity and accountability mechanisms to this level are
missing or limited; and (3) the on-the-ground capacity (in conflict regions)
to differentiate sources and ensure independence from operations that may
support warring groups does not exist.141
One particular concern is issuers’ ability to track the origin of gold used
in their products. The OECD, which issued guidance for due diligence in
supply chains for tin, tantalum, and tungsten, finalized its supplement for
the gold supply chain nine months after publishing its guidance for the 3Ts
supply chain, adding fuel to the argument that the gold supply chain has
unique aspects that render it more difficult to regulate.142 In particular,
advocates for treating gold separately from the other conflict minerals point
out that gold is refined by thousands of diverse operators, and is often
137. Id. at 1148–49.
138. The Chamber of Commerce and other industry participants have filed suit based on
the SEC’s economic estimate, similar to the situation in Business Roundtable. Ian Thoms,
SEC’S Toned-Down Conflict Mineral Rule Still Faces a Fight, LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2012,
5:47 PM), http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/News/d1217489-3fea-44f4-adf6-0a606a1c0d0
3/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ed52f4c7-d35a-409d-9e35-0b928ec0053d/SEC's%20Toned
-Down%20Conflict%20Mineral%20Rule%20Still%20Faces%20A%20Fight.pdf; see also
Matthews, supra note 133.
139. See Sheridan, supra note 8.
140. Resolve, Tracing a Path Forward: A Study of the Challenges of the Supply Chain
for Target Metals Used in Electronics, EICC, 5 (April 2010), http://www.eicc.info/
documents/resolvereport4.10.10.pdf.
141. Id.
142. JVC Comment Letter, supra note 118, at 6–8.
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refined more than once. In addition, newly mined gold is often melded
together with scrap and other existing stocks of gold, and the sources of the
already-existing gold is impossible to determine.143 Unlike the other
conflict minerals listed, gold is inherently valuable and often used as
currency, making the market for gold very dynamic and fluid, which
increases the difficulty in charting its supply chain.144
C. Timing for Compliance
An issuer with a disclosure obligation under section 1502 must file its
first report by May 31, 2014, regardless of its filing date for other SEC
reports.145 The CMRs due in 2014 cover the calendar year of 2013. Large
companies, such as Kraft Foods, have complained that they will need
additional time to perform proper due diligence on their entire supply
chains and that the due diligence could take longer than a year.146 The SEC
has indicated, however, that it will allow for a phase-in period for
companies required to disclose, so that these companies can perform the
requisite due diligence of their supply chains.147 The final rule reflects the
“phase-in period” and refers to the temporary two-year period in which a
company can state that its products are “DRC conflict undeterminable.”148
D. Statutory Liability: “Furnished” vs. “Filed”
Another important point regarding the overall efficacy of this provision
lies in the procedural requirements of the CMR itself and the liability that
attaches to those requirements. Section 1502 does not include stated

143. Id. at 12.
144. Id. at 6–8. Gold industry members encouraged the SEC to adopt a phased-in
approach for section 1502 to allow them to prepare for compliance with the obstacles
inherent in the gold supply chain. Id. at 4–11.
145. See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,305 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). It should be noted that section 1502 does not
mandate that the disclosure be provided in a registrant’s annual report, unlike Dodd-Frank’s
section 1503, Reporting Requirements Regarding Coal and Other Mine Safety, and section
1504, Disclosure Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, which required disclosures to be
provided in a company’s “periodic report” or annual report, respectively. Compare DoddFrank, § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. V 2011), with id. §§ 1503–1504. For this reason, the
SEC had the freedom to create Form SD in order to streamline compliance with the conflict
mineral regulation. It should be noted, however, that the recent suit filed by the Chamber of
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers could result in a stay of the final
rule, which would delay its enforcement and provide additional time for companies affected
by the rule. See Matthews, supra note 133.
146. Sarah Johnson, Searching for Missing Supply-Chain Links, CFO (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www3.cfo.com/article/2011/10/supply-chain_sec-conflict-minerals-rule-searching-formissing-supply-chain-links. Kraft Foods, with 40,000 products and 100,000 suppliers,
recently determined that the minerals may be a component in the pouch packaging of juice
products. Edward Wyatt, Behind the Blood Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at B1.
147. Sarah Lynch, SEC To Have Phase-In on Conflict Minerals Rule, REUTERS (Mar. 6,
2012, 1:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-minerals-conflict-schapiroidUSTRE8251DE20120306.
148. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,322–23.
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punishments or liabilities for noncompliance with the provision. According
to the SEC’s proposed rule, issuers were merely required to “furnish,”
rather than “file,” the CMR and the certified audit that accompanies it to the
SEC.149 This difference was not a semantic one; merely “furnishing” the
report with the Commission meant that the issuer was not open to section
18 liability.150 This did not mean that these disclosures were immune from
any liability; rather, they would have been open to the same liability that
accompanies section 13a and section 15d disclosures.151 Section 13(a) and
section 15(d) liability typically attaches if an issuer fails to furnish a
required exhibit or if a required exhibit is “unreliable.”152 The penalties for
these violations may be injunctive, civil, or criminal and can extend to
executives of the issuing company.153
In its proposed rule, the SEC noted that because the conflict minerals
regulation is vastly different from other reporting requirements that
typically deal with the financial health of a corporation, it would not submit
issuers to the additional section 18 liability.154 In practical terms, this
meant that there would have been no private right of action for failure to
comply with section 1502, aside from a claim based on fraud. Instead, only
the SEC would have had the authority to enforce compliance and to punish
noncompliance.
After much pressure from members of Congress and other
nongovernmental organizations, however, the SEC increased the scope of
liability in its final rule. In its final rule, the SEC changed the language of
the rule to require that issuers file the newly created Form SD and (if
149. See Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,949–50 (Dec. 23,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b). In a letter to the SEC on February 16,
2012, Senator Patrick Leahy, Representative Howard Berman, and other members of
Congress indicated their concern over the rule’s requirement of “furnishing” rather than
“filing” the CMR. See Comment Letter from Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senator, et al., to Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 1 (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-40-10/s74010-497.pdf. The letter states that, as a result, the rule does not
reflect congressional intent to protect investors and hold issuers accountable for the
substance of the disclosures. Id. at 2. Additionally, the letter evinces congressional concern
that the rule allows for an indeterminate country of origin category in contrast with other
members of Congress who encouraged inclusion of an indeterminate country of origin
category. Id. at 1.
150. Section 18 of the ’34 Act makes reporting issuers liable for “false or misleading
statements” if investors rely on such statements when purchasing or selling securities at a
price which was affected by such statements. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15
U.S.C. § 78m (2006).
151. The SEC alone regulates disclosures pursuant to sections 13 and 15 of the ’34 Act.
Of course, all material disclosures open issuers up to section 10b-5 liability for fraud. 15
U.S.C. § 78j.
152. International Trade Alert, Conflict Minerals Update: Letter from Congress
Indicates SEC Final Rule is Imminent, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, 2 (Feb.
17, 2012), http://www.akingump.com/files/Publication/908f6607-f535-4df6-aee1-991835fec
513/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c2b3d597-b221-43f5-80ec-f80353e4fdc2/120217_
Conflict_Minerals_Update_Letter_From_Congress.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,960–61.
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necessary) the CMR as an exhibit to that form.155 This change now opens
issuers up to potential shareholder liability, as well as potential
investigations from the SEC itself. Of course, the SEC must enforce
compliance with section 1502 in the same way it enforces compliance with
its other material disclosure requirements. This means that the SEC is
charged with evaluating disclosures made by electronics corporations,
mining corporations, and others affected by the legislation, to ensure that
the corporations’ disclosures pertaining to the origin of minerals is
accurate.156 The SEC will likely rely upon the independently certified
audits to enforce compliance; however, a certified audit is only required if a
company determines that it does, in fact, use conflict minerals in its
products. This means that any company that denies the use of conflict
minerals is not required to have a certified audit, and the SEC likely will
have little capacity to validate that assertion.
However, the specter of 10b-5 liability that attaches to any disclosure
requirement should not be underestimated.157 Rule 10b-5 provides a
private right of action to shareholders injured in the sale or purchase of a
security by false or misleading statements made by corporate insiders,158
and the threat of 10b-5 liability alone is sufficient to incentivize a company
to comply with any statutorily required disclosures. Rule 10b-5 is the
biggest proverbial stick available to both the SEC and private shareholders
and has been referred to as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn”159 as it applies to all corporate statements, not only
those required in periodic and annual filings.160 The threat of 10b-5
liability, in addition to the newly accorded private right of action to
shareholders by virtue of Form SD being “filed” rather than merely
“furnished,” will surely incentivize issuers to fully comply with the new
regulation.

155. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,280 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. V 2011).
157. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
158. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
159. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
160. See, e.g., Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under the
Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for Pollution Control,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093, 1115–16 (1993).
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IV. LEGAL AND GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES WITH SECTION 1502
Section 1502 represents a marked departure from traditional disclosure
requirements mandated under section 13. As discussed above, section 13 of
the ’34 Act, which was amended by section 1502, historically has required
broad reporting requirements focused on financial and economic data,
giving investors insight into the financial health of an issuer and the risks
associated with any sweeping changes in the company.161 For example,
one important, and prototypical, section 13 disclosure requirement applies
to persons holding more than 5 percent of a certain class of security.162
This disclosure is required because the acquisition of more than 5 percent of
a certain class of security could indicate the presence of an activist
shareholder and could result in a substantial change in shareholdings. A
holder of more than 5 percent of a certain class of securities can potentially
seek to influence management or the direction of a shareholder vote or
transaction.163 This type of information is decidedly financial and, perhaps
for that reason alone, important to investors.
Section 1502, however, stands in stark contrast to the existing section 13
disclosure requirements and to the SEC’s mandate itself.164 In particular,
the newly instituted statutory disclosure requirement will force companies
to provide nonmaterial information to investors and the public. In other
words, section 1502 statutorily renders material the nonmaterial information
of the presence of conflict minerals in an issuing company’s product.
Generating this obligation to disclose a fact that, absent the legislative
requirement, likely would not affect a reasonable investor’s decision to
invest in a company, is problematic from both a securities law standpoint
and a public international law standpoint, as will be discussed below.165

161. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006).
162. Id. § 78m(d).
163. See MARK SCHONFELD ET AL., ENFORCEMENT ACTION ON SECTION 13(D) DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CLARIFIES EXCEPTION FOR “ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS,” SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 3 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Schonfeld-Moloney-Loseman-Enfor
ActionSec13(d).pdf.
164. In its Comment Letter to the SEC, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP noted that “[s]ection
1502 was added to further an important public policy relating to the tragic events occurring
in the Congo, rather than to further investor protection.” Comment Letter from Davis Polk &
Wardwell LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter DPW
Comment Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-142.pdf.
The Comment Letter underscored the lack of investor protection in the legislation’s goals as
an argument that the information should not be required in a registrant’s annual report. Id. at
4–5.
165. See, e.g., Statement of Commissioner Gallagher, supra note 121 (“I do not like to
see social or foreign policy provisions engrafted onto the securities laws. I have serious
doubt, in any event, about the efficacy of using the securities laws to effect social and
foreign policy aims, however noble and urgent.”).
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A. Rendering Nonmaterial Information Material
The critical importance of disclosure in securities law is relevant to the
critique of section 1502 because, as indicated in the legislative history of
the Brownback Amendment, Congress hopes that investors will consider an
issuer’s use of conflict minerals as material information.166 The ultimate
question, therefore, is whether the use of conflict minerals is material
information.167 Obviously, the legislation itself renders that question moot
by statutorily requiring disclosure rather than requiring an analysis of
materiality. However, disclosure of social and environmental information
is typically not required because that information, to date, has not been
regarded as relevant or material to the financial condition of a company.168
As noted above, the SEC regulations, while not explicitly adopting an
economic standard for materiality, implicitly define material information as
that which bears on the economic value of an investment.169 Consider the
166. DPW Comment Letter, supra note 164, at 2.
167. The question of materiality for use of conflict minerals is one that this Article does
not undertake in its entirety, given that the question is rendered moot by the legislative
requirements. A more robust analysis of materiality as it relates to conflict mineral
disclosure will be handled in my future scholarship.
168. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual
Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty To Disclose
Material Non-financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 161 (2007). Monsma and
Olson observe, however, that nonfinancial information can be considered “economic” in
sustainable development terms “and in this way financially relevant to socially responsible
investors.” Id. at 185. In addition, Monsma and Olson state that financial analysts in several
countries have begun to factor in corporate social and environmental responsibility, such as
carbon emissions efficiency, in evaluating a company’s investment potential. Id. at 185–86.
Monsma and Olson argue that socially responsible investor firms consider nonfinancial
social responsibility and environmental performance as material information for their funds.
Id. at 196–97. Without a clear economic link to the valuation of an investment, however, the
social and environmental information may not rise to the legal definition of materiality as
espoused by the SEC and the Supreme Court.
169. Williams, supra note 17, at 1264; see also BENN STEIL & ROBERT E. LITAN,
FINANCIAL STATECRAFT: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
64 (2006) (“[T]he SEC assesses materiality on the basis of its relevance to investor financial
interests. The SEC’s role is not to advise investors about what is good for them—let alone
what might be good for the United States—or even to educate investors regarding ethical,
religious, or foreign policy matters which may attach to doing business overseas. These
matters may well be assigned, through appropriate legislation, to other arms of the
government but ill-suit an agency whose reputation for integrity across the globe is
intimately bound up with its ability to remain scrupulously neutral in questions as to which
businesses do and do not ‘deserve’ private capital. This reputation is critical to America’s
ability to attract capital markets activity within its legal jurisdiction.”).
Steil and Litan point to the example of PetroChina to show the evolution of requiring
disclosure of nonfinancial information. Id. at 65. In 2000, China National Petroleum
Company (CNPC) decided to list on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with the hopes
of raising $5–10 billion in equity capital. Id. at 58. The offering resulted in strong pushback
from members of Congress and interest groups who were opposed to CNPC’s heavy
involvement in the Sudanese oil industry. Id. CNPC reacted to the criticism and restructured
itself in such a way that only a subsidiary entity with no Sudanese assets, PetroChina, would
be listed on NYSE. Id. PetroChina’s critics were not assuaged and continued campaigning
against its IPO. Id. Ultimately, the PetroChina IPO was downsized to roughly $3 billion. Id.
at 59.
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scenario in which a company files a CMR with a clear misstatement of fact
and is sued by a shareholder. The materiality question that would be
paramount to the analysis of such a case is whether the shareholder could
prove loss or loss causation. This is typically proven by evaluating the
change in stock price when the issuer makes various announcements, such
as the corrective disclosure.170 In the case of conflict minerals, it seems
unlikely that such a disclosure would drastically move a company’s share
price, thus proving the immateriality of the information.
Indeed, the SEC’s proposed rule stated exactly that point:
It appears that the nature and purpose of the Conflict Minerals Provision
is for the disclosure of certain information to help end the emergency
humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC that is financed by the
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the DRC
countries, which is qualitatively different from the nature and purpose of
the disclosure of information that has been required under the periodic
reporting provisions of the Exchange Act.171

Amending section 13 to include this disclosure requirement flies in the face
of the SEC’s mandate, and is not in keeping with the existing disclosure
requirements of section 13.172 Furthermore, requiring the SEC to enforce
In the wake of the PetroChina IPO, Representative Frank Wolf issued a letter to the
then-acting SEC Chairman Laura Unger stating:
While other governmental agencies have jurisdiction over human rights, national
security and other related abuses in Sudan, in this case it is corporations with
securities that have been offered to U.S. investors, not governments, that have
committed offenses. For that reason, the SEC, with its authority and mandate to
oversee disclosure to inform and protect investors, should recognize material
omissions by the companies as a violation of their disclosure requirements and
take appropriate action.
Id. at 63. Unger responded by proposing enhanced disclosure requirements for foreign
registrants conducting business in sanctioned countries, noting that U.S. investors should
receive adequate disclosures about where the proceeds of their securities investments are
going and how they are being used, regardless of whether such disclosures were considered
material under the SEC’s standard of materiality. Letter from Laura S. Unger, Acting
Chairman, SEC, to Frank P. Wolf, U.S. Representative 3 (May 8, 2001), available at
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/cpapp6.pdf.
As a result of the
requirement of additional disclosures set forth in the Unger Letter, in 2004 the SEC created
an Office of Global Security Risk (OGSR) within its Division of Corporation Finance to
“monitor whether the documents public companies file with the SEC include disclosure of
material information regarding global security risk-related issues.” Office of Global Security
Risk, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/globalsecrisk.htm (last visited Nov. 16,
2012). Thus, through the pressure from Congress in the wake of the Sudanese crisis in
Darfur, the SEC systematically shifted its disclosure requirements beyond the strict
definition of materiality. Notably, however, Roger Robinson, Chairman of the Casey
Institute, stated in his response to the Unger letter that “‘[n]ational security, human rights
and religious freedom are now regarded as material risks to investors.’” STEIL & LITAN,
supra, at 65.
170. See generally Jon Koslow, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action
Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811 (1991).
171. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,960 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b) (emphasis added).
172. Commissioner Gallagher made this point in his dissenting remarks at the August 22,
2012, SEC Open Meeting to adopt the final rule:
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these disclosure requirements stretches thin an already overburdened
agency and demands that it oversee diplomatic and humanitarian
regulations for which it lacks the institutional competence.
B. Indirect Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Regulation of an
Entire Supply Chain
In attempting to curb violence in the Congo the stated aim of section
1502—Congress could have asserted more direct extraterritorial jurisdiction
and banned any product from any company, domestic or foreign, to be sold
in the United States if it contained conflict minerals.173 In the case of
section 1502, however, Congress chose a more indirect approach to meet its
extraterritorial goals. Extraterritorial jurisdiction of section 1502 is indirect
in that foreign firms not registered on an American exchange, and therefore
not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, may be forced to comply with the
provision because they are part of a supply chain in which the final product
is manufactured by an issuing company. Although outside the reach of any
SEC disclosure requirement or liability scheme, a foreign company may
feel the pressure from an issuing company to have an entire supply chain in
compliance with section 1502, which may result in foreign companies
rising to meet the standard required by the provision despite not facing any
similar requirements in their home jurisdiction.
Of course, section 1502 is not the first time Congress has indirectly
allowed for the SEC to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction. One prior example
of such indirect jurisdiction is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act174 (FCPA).
It is easy to see that the SEC role in this provision is the anomaly. That’s because
disclosure requirements in the securities laws are about telling investors what they
reasonably should want to know before investing in a company. The point is to
give investors information that is inherently “material” to their investment
decisions. Disclosure is, and should be, the primary tool for the SEC to use in
satisfying its mission. And so it is paramount that we focus on getting timely,
material disclosures to investors. . . . Unfortunately, Section 1502 is about
curtailing violence in the DRC; it is not about investor protection, promoting fair
and efficient markets, or capital formation. Warlords and armed criminals need to
fund their nefarious operations. Their funding is their lifeline; it’s a chokepoint
that should be cut off. That is a perfectly reasonable foreign policy objective. But
it’s not an objective that fits anywhere within the SEC’s threefold statutory
mission.
Statement of Commissioner Gallagher, supra note 121.
173. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37–39 (2012). Brummer, in describing territoriality and
financial statecraft, lists various possibilities for direct extraterritorial application, none of
which fall directly in line with the jurisdiction of section 1502. One example of direct
extraterritorial jurisdiction that he notes is direct regulation of foreign firms, but this applies
in the case of section 1502 only where the foreign firm is registered on an American
exchange. Id. at 38. Another example he observes is jurisdiction over foreign firms when the
foreign firms engage in conduct that has effects on the regulating country, but section 1502
does not go this far and does not regulate, at least directly, foreign firms who sell products
with conflict minerals in the United States. Id. at 40.
174. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-1 to -2 (2006)). In 1977, Congress passed the FCPA, aimed at eradicating bribery
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Interestingly, both the FCPA and section 1502 require corporate due
diligence as means of compliance; both provisions arose out of a concern
regarding foreign activities; and both provisions mirror international
guidelines and goals.175 Although both regulations aim at stemming an
activity occurring abroad, the FCPA, unlike section 1502, has its underlying
roots in preventing market manipulation and fraud.176 This is a critical
difference, given that the SEC—the agency responsible for ensuring market
fairness and transparency—is also the regulatory agency responsible for
enforcing section 1502, and has concurrent jurisdiction over regulating the
FCPA with the Department of Justice. In other words, the FCPA involves
regulation of malfeasance of the corporation’s employees that directly
relates to an issuer’s financial bottom line, making the SEC a reasonable
entity for regulating the accounting and records fraud inherent in FCPA
violations. Obviously, the SEC has clear jurisdiction over the actions of
employees or agents of issuers. Section 1502, on the other hand, deals only
with disclosures of questionably material information, with the goal that the
malfeasance of others, not employed or linked to the corporation, be
stemmed. That is, section 1502 aims at deterring the activities of warlords
and rebels in the DRC, not the employees or agents of issuers. As such, its
enforcement falls well outside the mandate and expertise of the SEC.177

occurring overseas, for the purpose of obtaining business. Id. The impetus for this
legislation was that the SEC had investigated numerous companies in the 1970s and
discovered that over four hundred companies had made questionable payments totaling over
$300 million to foreign officials. See Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Antibribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2902–03 (2005). Specifically,
the FCPA prohibits the corrupt use of the mail or any other instrumentality of interstate
commerce in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of money or any other thing of value to any person, knowing that all or some of the
payment will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to
influence or induce the foreign official to either commit an act in violation of his or her
lawful duty, or to secure an improper advantage in obtaining or retaining business. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a) (Supp. V 2011). In addition to the antibribery provision regulated by the
Department of Justice, the FCPA also includes accounting provisions that require
corporations to make and keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions of the corporation and to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal
accounting methods. Id. § 78m.
175. See, e.g., OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 1997,
available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-bribery
convention/38028044.pdf; OECD, OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE
SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS 2011
[hereinafter OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE], available at http://www.oecd.org/
investment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/46740847.pdf;
176. But see Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting
Global Corruption Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009991 (theorizing that the
FCPA and the act of combatting global corruption is not within the mandate of the SEC and
that the SEC’s enforcement of the FCPA diverts scarce resources from the SEC’s core
mission).
177. See supra Part I.
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C. Efficacy of “Name and Shame” Legislation in
Achieving Humanitarian Goals
Critics of section 1502 contend that it likely will not have an effect on the
conflict mineral enterprise in Congo. First, the thrust of the legislation is
that it will cause companies to disclose their use of conflict minerals and
that this disclosure alone will merely result in “naming and shaming.”
Ideally, the “shaming” will incentivize the corporations to make changes
and become better corporate actors. The regulation, however, does not
require that companies cease, or even attempt to cease, their use of conflict
minerals. That is, the efficacy of the provision turns on the public
consciousness and reaction to learning that certain corporations have
products that contain conflict minerals. This, of course, assumes that not
only investors, but the public at large will review the companies’ websites
or SEC disclosures to learn whether a particular company has made a
conflict mineral disclosure.178
The ultimate consideration concerning the efficacy of the “name and
shame” legislation is this: What is the consequence for a company that uses
conflict minerals and then complies with section 1502 and discloses this
fact? In such a situation, the SEC obviously plays no role because the
company has complied with regulatory standards. Ostensibly, a company
can file a CMR with the SEC, publish the CMR on its website, and cross its
fingers hoping that there is no public backlash that affects its bottom line or
its brand. From a public international law standpoint, it would seem that
the possibility of a remorseless, albeit SEC-compliant company, reduces the
legislation to a toothless tiger.
Based on citizen outcry related to conflict minerals, however, it is very
possible that the “name and shame” legislation could be effective.179 For
example, some companies were accused of lobbying to undercut the utility
of section 1502 and were met with backlash from citizens. Intel, for
example, had been specifically targeted for the way in which it has handled
its stance on this legislation and was forced to analyze its supply chain.180
178. See Ripken, supra note 34, at 146 (“In order for a disclosure system to be effective,
not only must information that is supplied be disclosed completely . . . it must also be read
and comprehended by the consumer.”). The emphasis in securities law on providing
information to the public is premised on the belief that individuals are rational, selfgoverning actors who are willing and able to process the information wisely. If we assume
that investors are rational risk calculators who are consistently capable of weighing the costs
and benefits of risky alternatives and selecting the best option, then a system of disclosure
makes good sense.
179. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 168, at 184 (“Brand reputation, among other
business incentives, drives companies to manage areas that lie beyond regulatory compliance
and tangible financial relevance.”).
180. See Intel & Congo Minerals, supra note 123. Intel initially deleted critical
comments on its Facebook page made by activists over its stance on the conflict mineral
legislation. After reinstating the deleted comments, Intel released a statement that said, “For
well over a year, we have been engaged in both conversations with NGOs and our own
industry focused on creating workable solutions. We have shared with our suppliers our
current position on the issue. . . . We also support the objective of US legislation to address
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Indeed, the public awareness of conflict minerals has increased over the
past few years, with celebrity activists including Robin Wright and Ben
Affleck lobbying Congress on the issue and writing op-eds online and in
major newspapers.181
The general public, however, is not the constituency of the SEC;
investors are.182 If the SEC administered its regulations with an eye toward
protecting all citizens, rather than only shareholders, it would be difficult to
maintain capital formation and to balance the requirements of the agency’s
mandate. For this reason, as described in the previous section, the SEC has
never waded very far into regulation of human rights or even corporate
social responsibility.183
D. Hurting More Than Helping? A De Facto Embargo
The likely result of the implementation of section 1502 is that the
disclosure requirements “may lead to a de facto embargo on formal trade if
businesses decide to pull out of the region.”184 This concern was addressed
by Senator Feingold in his statement to the Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee, which reiterated that the goal of the legislation is
not to shut down the mineral trade, but to support a conflict-free mining
economy that benefits the Congolese people.185 Nevertheless, Congolese
activists and others have continually asserted that this regulation will lead,
and has already led, to an embargo of Congolese minerals, a drastic cost

this problem.” Press Release, Intel, Intel’s Statement on Conflict Minerals Issue (May 19,
2010), available at http://blogs.intel.com/csr/2010/05/intels_statement_on_conflict_m.php.
181. Robin Wright, From Dragon Tattoo to Congo: Combatting the Scourge of Violence
Against Women, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2010, 2:22 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/robin/from-dragon-tattoo-to-con_b_1197226.html; Ben Affleck, The
Deadliest War, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at A21.
182. See STEIL & LITAN, supra note 169, at 71 (“[T]he SEC is chartered to protect
American investor interests. It is not chartered to protect, let alone advance, American
foreign policy interests.”).
183. There are, however, advocates for compelling the SEC to expand nonfinancial,
social disclosure requirements. These advocates point to socially conscious investors who
deem such information as material to their investment decisions. See, e.g., Monsma &
Olson, supra note 168, at 161; see also Comment Letter from Iain Richards, Reg’l Head of
Corporate Governance, Aviva Investors, et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC (Nov. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-11.pdf (advocating for improved
corporate reporting on supply chain factors because they pose material risks to investors that
are not typically disclosed); see also Rachel Cherington, Note, Securities Laws and
Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward an Expanded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. PA. J.
INT’L. ECON. L. 1439 (2004).
184. U.S. Shines Glare on Congo’s Conflict Minerals, REUTERS, July 21, 2010, available
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/07/21/congos-conflict-minerals-idUKLNE66K047201
00721 (quoting Nicholas Garrett, Director, Resource Consulting Services).
185. 155 CONG REC. 10599–10600 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold). Notably, both
dissenting SEC Commissioners at the SEC Open Meeting remarked the logical result of such
a rule is a de facto embargo of the DRC. See Statement of Commissioner Gallagher, supra
note 121; Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting to Adopt a Final
Rule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Aug.
22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212tap-minerals.htm.
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that would outweigh any purported benefits of the regulation.186 Indeed,
with major American corporations shying away from using Congolese
minerals, certain mines in Congo have suspended operations, forcing many
Congolese out of work.187 By mid-2011, exports of tin, tantalum, and
tungsten from the DRC had fallen by 70 percent since the previous summer,
a phenomenon that the local miners refer to as “Obama’s embargo.”188
Furthermore, the de facto embargo is not even alleviating the human rights
abuses occurring in the DRC, which is the stated aim of section 1502.189
Importantly, conflict minerals legislation could lead to an embargo that
has only limited international cooperation, which could lead to regulatory
arbitrage. As noted above, the third mandate of the SEC’s regulatory
authority is facilitating capital formation. This prong is often in tension
with the other two prongs of the SEC’s authority: protecting investors and
maintaining fair markets. The reason for this tension is that if the U.S.
markets are highly (or, arguably, overly) regulated, investors will flee the
U.S. market for less burdensome markets, taking their capital along with
them.190 This concept of regulatory arbitrage is usually the central critique
of additional regulations, and section 1502 is not immune to this criticism.
The assertion that section 1502 will result in open season for other
countries to exploit Congolese minerals is not without merit. China, for
example, has capitalized on the stringent U.S. regulation and now seems to
possess a virtual monopoly on the Congolese minerals.191 A Congolese
civil society member stated that the Chinese mineral buyers are
paying 20 percent less, maybe even 30 percent less than the old price,
because now they are the only buyers. . . . The lower price means fewer
people are bringing minerals to sell, and a lot of mines have suspended
operations. But the Chinese are buying what comes to them. Their
warehouses are full, with constant turnover.192

186. See, e.g., David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. TIMES, August 8,
2011, at A19; see also Hans Bader, Thousands of Jobs and Billions in Wealth Wiped Out by
Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals Provision, OPEN MARKET (July 27, 2011),
http://www.openmarket.org/2011/07/27/thousands-of-jobs-and-billions-in-wealth-wiped-outby-dodd-frank-conflict-minerals-provision/.
187. See Mary Kay Magistad, Why Chinese Mineral Buyers Are Eyeing Congo, PRI’S
WORLD (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.theworld.org/2011/10/chinese-conflict-minerals-congo/.
188. Editorial, Africa and “Obama’s Embargo,” WALL ST. J., July 18, 2011, at A12.
189. Laura Seay, Congo Conflict Minerals Bill Hurts the Miners It Hopes To Help,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 18, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://csmonitor.com/
layout/set/print/content/view/print/398136 (“[C]utting off demand for Congolese minerals on
international markets does absolutely nothing to stop violence against civilians and only
makes life for many civilians worse by leaving them with no viable means of financially
supporting themselves or their families.”).
190. See generally Harald Baum, Globalizing Capital Markets and Possible Regulatory
Responses, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTERNET, CAPITAL
MARKETS AND INSOLVENCY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 77 (Jurgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono
eds., 2000).
191. Magistad, supra note 187.
192. Id.
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The optimal solution to the problem of regulatory arbitrage and the
subsequent exploitation of the American boycott of conflict minerals is that
other countries will follow suit and enact legislation similar to section 1502.
Indeed, certain international organizations have encouraged conflict mineral
regulation in member states, including the OECD and the United
Nations.193 Ideally, other countries would follow the United States’
example and enact legislation similar to section 1502, much like what has
happened internationally with the FCPA and its international equivalents,
such as the U.K. Bribery Act.194 Thus, unlike section 1502, the FCPA now
has international counterparts, making eradication of global corruption a
truly international goal. However, in the case of section 1502, until there is
more international involvement in the potential embargo on Congolese
minerals the risk for arbitrage and exploitation remains very real and very
high.
V. A BETTER MODEL: THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AND THE CLEAN
DIAMOND TRADE ACT
Rather than looking to the SEC to regulate and police the potentially
unwieldy number of issuers that will produce CMRs, Congress should have
modeled its conflict mineral regime on the existing conflict diamond
regulatory scheme.195 In January 2003, a coalition of states, NGOs, and
corporations launched the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(“Kimberley Process,” or “KPCS”), an international governmental
certification scheme designed to prevent trade in conflict diamonds.196
Countries participating in the Kimberley Process were required to pass
domestic legislation enforcing a set of import and export controls for rough

193. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008), available at
DUE
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1857(2008);
OECD
DILIGENCE GUIDANCE, supra note 175.
194. 2010, c. 23 (Eng.).
195. Conflict diamonds are defined as “diamonds that originate from areas [in Africa]
controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized
governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments.” U.N.
Dep’t of Pub. Info., Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, U.N. (Mar. 21, 2001),
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html.
196. The Kimberly Process, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/
conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). The initial
enthusiasm behind the Kimberley Process started as early as 1998, when Global Witness
began exposing the role that diamonds play in funding conflict in central African states. In
May of 2000, representatives from the diamond industry and diamond producing countries
met in Kimberley, South Africa, to discuss ways of handling the conflict diamond trade.
Karen E. Woody, Diamonds on the Souls of Her Shoes: The Kimberley Process and the
Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions, 22 CONN. J. INT’L. L., 335, 343 (2007). This initial
meeting led to three years of negotiations to enact the Kimberley Process. See id. at 343–44.
In the Interlaken Declaration of November 5, 2002, representatives of the United States and
forty-seven other signatory countries announced the imminent launch of the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme. Id.
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diamonds.197 Thus, in 2003, President Bush signed the Clean Diamond
Trade Act198 (CDTA), mandating that the importation into, and exportation
from, the United States of any rough diamonds be controlled by the KPCS
standards and procedures.199 Specifically, the KPCS standards required
that the United States trade rough diamonds only with other signatories to
the KPCS.200 In addition, according to the KPCS, all participating
countries’ internal controls must include requiring a certificate of origin for
all rough diamonds imported or exported.201 The KPCS is chaired by
participating countries on a rolling basis, and members of the KPCS, as
well as industry representatives202 and civil society observers, meet twice a
year at plenary meetings to monitor the success of the regime.203 Although
not lacking in critics,204 the KPCS has reduced the international trade in

197. Woody, supra note 196, at 345. Significantly, the KPCS only regulates rough
diamonds, or diamonds that have not been cut or polished. See id. at 344. Rough diamonds
are also easier to trace because once diamonds are cut and polished, any form of
identification can be erased. Id. at 344 n.71. Because the KPCS regime is concerned
primarily with the source of the diamond, it limited its reach to only rough diamonds. See id.
at 344.
198. Pub. L. No. 108-19, 117 Stat. 631 (2003).
199. Id. § 2.
200. Raj, supra note 9, at 995–96. The current participating entities are Angola, Armenia,
Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, China,
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, European Union members, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. KP
Participants and Observers, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess
.com/web/kimberley-process/kp-participants-and-observers (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
These members account for approximately 99.8 percent of the global production of rough
diamonds. KP Basics, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/
kimberley-process/kp-basics (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
201. Raj, supra note 9, at 995–96.
202. The World Diamond Council participates in the KPCS as an observer, monitoring
the effectiveness of the certification scheme and providing technical and administrative
advice. See Mission Statement, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.world
diamondcouncil.org/about-wdc/mission-statement (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
203. KP Basics, supra note 200. The United States is the chair of the KPCS for 2012. Id.
204. Recently, the KPCS has come under fire for, among other things, its continued
inclusion of Zimbabwe among its members. See, e.g., Loopholes in the Kimberley Process:
Illegal Trade Undermines Efforts To Combat Conflict Diamonds, GLOBAL WITNESS, 4 (Oct.
2007), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/loopholes_in_the_kimberley_
process.pdf (noting that the KPCS needed to be more proactive in monitoring
infringements); Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process,
Calls for Diamond Trade To Be Held Accountable (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-callsdiamond-trade-be-held-accountable (announcing that one of the founding NGOs in the
KPCS abandoned the program because of conflict diamond trading in Cote d’Ivoire,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, all signatories to the KPCS); see also Devon Maylie, Split Opens
in Body Monitoring Diamonds, WALL ST. J., Jun. 25–26, 2011, at A11 (detailing how the
KPCS leadership overrode objections from the U.S. and allowed exports of diamonds from
the Marange field in Zimbabwe, an area where the Zimbabwe army seized control and
allegedly committed human rights violations).
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conflict diamonds to a fraction of 1 percent, as compared to estimates of up
to 15 percent in the 1990s.205
Section 1502 and the CDTA are both legislative measures aimed at
curbing trade in materials that fund rebels in Africa.206 The goal of these
measures is to establish peace and the rule of law and stem the human rights
atrocities ravaging the continent.207 There are, however, crucial differences

205. KP Basics, supra note 200.
206. Despite the similar goals of the KPCS and section 1502, there are also differences
between the materials being regulated by the respective legislation. Although rough
diamonds will eventually be cut and polished, they are not smelted or combined with other
materials before becoming part of a final product. In this way, it is arguably easier to track
diamonds in the supply chain. Diamonds in themselves are valuable and can be used as
currency, unlike the 3Ts, but much like gold.
207. In passing the CDTA, Congress spelled out the human rights violations prompting
legislative action. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, § 2, 117 Stat. 631,
631–32 (2003) (“(1) Funds derived from the sale of rough diamonds are being used by rebels
and state actors to finance military activities, overthrow legitimate governments, subvert
international efforts to promote peace and stability, and commit horrifying atrocities against
unarmed civilians. During the past decade, more than 6,500,000 people from Sierra Leone,
Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been driven from their homes by
wars waged in large part for control of diamond mining areas. A million of these are
refugees eking out a miserable existence in neighboring countries, and tens of thousands
have fled to the United States. Approximately 3,700,000 people have died during these
wars. (2) The countries caught in this fighting are home to nearly 70,000,000 people whose
societies have been torn apart not only by fighting but also by terrible human rights
violations. (3) Human rights and humanitarian advocates, the diamond trade as represented
by the World Diamond Council, and the United States Government have been working to
block the trade in conflict diamonds. Their efforts have helped to build a consensus that
action is urgently needed to end the trade in conflict diamonds. (4) The United Nations
Security Council has acted at various times under chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to address threats to international peace and security posed by conflicts linked to
diamonds. Through these actions, it has prohibited all states from exporting weapons to
certain countries affected by such conflicts. It has further required all states to prohibit the
direct and indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone unless the diamonds are
controlled under specified certificate of origin regimes and to prohibit absolutely the direct
and indirect import of rough diamonds from Liberia. (5) In response, the United States
implemented sanctions restricting the importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to
those diamonds accompanied by specified certificates of origin and fully prohibiting the
importation of rough diamonds from Liberia. The United States is now taking further action
against trade in conflict diamonds. (6) Without effective action to eliminate trade in conflict
diamonds, the trade in legitimate diamonds faces the threat of a consumer backlash that
could damage the economies of countries not involved in the trade in conflict diamonds and
penalize members of the legitimate trade and the people they employ. To prevent that, South
Africa and more than 30 other countries are involved in working, through the ‘Kimberley
Process’, toward devising a solution to this problem. As the consumer of a majority of the
world’s supply of diamonds, the United States has an obligation to help sever the link
between diamonds and conflict and press for implementation of an effective solution.
(7) Failure to curtail the trade in conflict diamonds or to differentiate between the trade in
conflict diamonds and the trade in legitimate diamonds could have a severe negative impact
on the legitimate diamond trade in countries such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and
Tanzania. (8) Initiatives of the United States seek to resolve the regional conflicts in subSaharan Africa which facilitate the trade in conflict diamonds. (9) The Interlaken
Declaration on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds of
November 5, 2002, states that Participants will ensure that measures taken to implement the
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in the execution of the legislative goals of these two bills. First, the CDTA
came into being as a result of American participation in the KPCS. In other
words, the international groundswell to handle the problem of conflict
diamonds existed prior to the enactment of the legislation, and the United
States joined an international effort by passing domestic legislation
furthering the aims of the KPCS. Unlike the formidable beginning of the
CDTA, there is not similar legislation to that of section 1502 in other
countries nor is there an international agreement among countries to fight
the exportation of conflict minerals from the DRC.208 Instead, the United
States has acted somewhat unilaterally in tackling the humanitarian crisis
funded by conflict minerals in the DRC.209
Second, Executive Order No. 13,312 implemented the CDTA, leaving
the authority over the CDTA’s regulation in the hands of the executive, then
President George W. Bush.210 In his executive order, Bush assigned certain
regulatory functions to the Secretary of State211 and others to the Secretary
of the Treasury (and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control).212 In addition, the CDTA authorizes the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection to enforce the import and export regulations.213 Section
1502, on the other hand, will be partially regulated by the SEC. It is only
“partially” regulated because if an issuer determines—correctly or not—that
its product does not contain any conflict minerals, it will not issue a conflict
mineral report at all, and the SEC likely will not have the resources to
investigate all companies furnishing conflict mineral reports, let alone all
companies failing to furnish the report.214 Unlike the CDTA, which
spreads responsibility of enforcement across agencies best equipped to
handle certain tasks, section 1502 tasks the SEC with regulation of the
entire conflict mineral compliance scheme.

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds will be consistent with
international trade rules.”).
208. Although not a binding international agreement, the OECD has issued guidance for
due diligence on supply chains for conflict minerals. See supra Part II.C.3.
209. Some advocates of section 1502 attest that international action is being taken. For
instance, the U.N. report issued in November 2011 stated that Rwandan border officials
returned eighty tons of intercepted minerals to Congolese authorities due to improved
traceability of parcels of cassiterite, coltan, and wolframite. U.N. Secretary-General, A
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2012/65 13 (Jan. 26, 2012), available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/206/29/PDF/N1220629.pdf.
210. Exec. Order No. 13,312, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,151 (July 29, 2003).
211. The State Department is responsible for waiving the KPCS requirements if it is in
the country’s national interests; conducting an annual review of the efficacy of the KPCS;
publishing a list of all KPCS participants in the Federal Register; creating and coordinating
the Kimberley Process Coordination Committee; and providing annual reports to Congress.
The Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for recordkeeping and issuing any licenses or
regulations necessary for carrying out the CDTA. Id.
212. Id.
213. Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, § 8(c), 117 Stat. 631, 631–32
(2003).
214. See supra Part II.C.
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Moreover, the Department of State and the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department are a better fit for conflict
mineral regulation. These entities handle international affairs and, in the
case of OFAC, existing sanctions programs. Because the stated aim of
section 1502 is to exact diplomatic and humanitarian results, the regulatory
body should be one more adept at effectuating these types of goals. The
SEC, as noted above, is not concerned with international human rights or
diplomacy issues and should not have its resources tapped to regulate
section 1502.
CONCLUSION
What is clear about section 1502, both from the legislative history and
the text of the provision itself, is that its goals are diplomatic and
humanitarian. Although these goals are lofty and admirable, Congress
should not place the burden of achieving these goals on the SEC.
Additional disclosure requirements aimed at effecting diplomatic ends do
not comport with the traditional financial disclosure requirements mandated
by section 13, nor do they effectively solve the international crises they
seek to alleviate. Further, the costs associated with the regulation, as well
as the direct and indirect effects of the legislation on the DRC and adjoining
countries, are only some of the reasons that section 1502 is an ill-advised
provision of Dodd-Frank. In sum, the burden of diplomatic and
humanitarian aid should come from agencies and groups that can better
shoulder the formidable responsibility of peacemaking in the DRC.

